

# Understanding Public Private Partnerships




Colorado PPP Symposium  
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# What is a Public-Private Partnership (PPP)?

“A form of project delivery resulting in a contractual agreement between public and private sector partners that allows for more private sector participation than is traditional.”

## Recent US PPP Projects





## What is Driving the Need for PPPs?


### Driving the need

Governments faced with several problems:

- Aging infrastructure
- Growing population in urban centers
- High level of services
- Construction costs increases
- Budgetary constraints:
  - Slower revenue growth
  - Resistance to tax increases
- Cost overruns and delays in traditional procurements



**Meeting the Need**



## Common Characteristics of PPPs

Risk allocation

Long term  
contracting

Performance  
based contracts

Innovation

Economies of  
scale

Whole life  
costing

Competition


Greater  
leveraging of  
public funds

Task integration  
and efficiencies  
in delivery


Affordability and  
value for money

# How are PPPs Structured?

Traditional Procurement Structure



PPP Structure



# PPP Business Models

*The risk sharing balance should determine the type of P3 used*




The PPP model chosen will have a major impact and should reflect careful consideration of the project objectives and the level of risk transfer appropriate for that particular project.

# Risk Allocation Defines the PPP Business Model

	Design	Construction	Operate Maintain	Financing	Traffic	Revenue
Design Bid Build (Traditional)	○	○	○	○	○	○
Design Build	●	●	○	○	○	○
Design Build Operate Maintain	●	●	●	○	○	○
Design Build Finance Operate Maintain (Availability Payment)	●	●	●	●	○	○
Design Build Finance Operate Maintain (Shadow User Fee)	●	●	●	●	●	○
Design Build Finance Operate Maintain (Real User Fee)	●	●	●	●	●	●

○ – Risk retained by Public Sector  
 ● – Risk transferred to Private Sector



## Design/Build

### **Designer and contractor hired under single contract**

- Selection usually based on best value

### **Private partner takes majority of design and construction risk**

- Introduces private sector innovation
- Greater cost and schedule certainty

### **Public sector has single point of contact**

- Design and construction disputes typically remain between designer and contractor

### **Public sponsor retains obligation to fund**

### **Public sector retains full operational and maintenance obligation**



## **Design/Build/Operate/Maintain**

### **Similar attributes to Design/Build**

#### **Private partner has long term operational and maintenance responsibility**

- Acts like an extended warranty

#### **Transfers life-cycle costs to Private Partner**


- Balances upfront capital costs v. long term maintenance costs

#### **Public Sponsor responsible for revenue and financing**

#### **Maximum term of 15 years**

- May be longer if Private Activity Bonds are used

#### **Suited for facilities with specialized operational and/or maintenance requirements**



## **Design/Build/Finance/Operate/Maintain**

**Similar to DBOM**

**Private Partner is responsible for financing**

**Public Sponsor responsible for revenue stream**


**Applicable to both revenue and non-revenue facilities**

**Also referred to as Availability Payment**

- Private Partner required to have facility “available”
- Annual payment is a function of facilities “availability”

**Suitability**

- Where transfer of revenue risk may not be best value for money
- Transit projects



## Concession

### **Greatest degree of risk transfer to the private sector**


- Design, Construction, Revenue, Finance, Operations, Maintenance, Capital Renewal
- Potentially includes capacity expansions

### **Public Sponsor retains least control**

- Rate Setting
- Operational/Performance Standards

### **Payments to Public Sponsor**

- Upfront payment
- Revenue Sharing
- Unplanned refinancing
- Excess revenue




## Payment Mechanisms

Payment Mechanism	Description	Advantage(s)	Disadvantage(s)
Real Tolls (Hard toll, HOT, Congestion pricing)	Developer collects tolls directly from the users of the facility	Developer takes risk related to usage, demand and collection of revenue  Established direct link between usage and compensation	Public acceptance of real tolls  Developer requires higher return because it retains usage and demand risk
Shadow Tolls	Public authority pays the developer a user fee based on the usage of the facility	Developer takes risk related to usage  Revenue payments are usually capped	Public authority takes risk related to revenue



## Payment Mechanisms


Payment Mechanism	Description	Advantage(s)	Disadvantage(s)
Availability Payment	Public authority pays the developer a periodic unitary payment based on availability and performance of the facility	<p>Availability payment is fixed subject to indexation</p> <p>Deductions to payments for unavailability and poor performance</p> <p>Developer requires lower return due to guaranteed payment stream (subject to deductions)</p> <p>Creates budgetary certainty for public authority (payment does not increase based on usage)</p> <p>Encourages developer to keep facility open and performing to standards</p>	<p>If usage does not meet forecast, then the public bears the risk of a redundant asset/loss of toll revenue</p> <p>Does not incentivize developer to improve service – only operates to avoid payment deductions</p> <p>Public authority must make commitment to long term payments (similar to debt service and O&amp;M outlay)</p>



## What is Risk?

Risk is an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative effect on at least one project variable

- Time
- Schedule
- Project or Program Development
- Financing
- Design/Engineering/Construction
- Operations and Maintenance
- Revenue
- Changes in Law
- Termination



## **Risk Allocation Considerations**

**Individual project characteristics will drive risk allocation strategy**

**Risk should be allocated to party best suited to manage the risk**


**Risks are more often allocated to private sector due to**

- strong project control
- ability to spread risk over time
- equity cushion


**If neither better situated to manage risk, share it**

**Value for money is maximized by the optimal allocation of risk**

# Evolution of Project Risk Profile




# Value for Money: Assessing the value of private participation




*Not to scale – illustrative only*


# PPP Contract Structure




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
# PPP Contract Structure



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## Protecting the Public Interest

### When and how could the “public interest” be at risk?

Setting and controlling fares/tolls?

Policing excessive returns?

Responding to poor service delivery?

Insolvency of private partners?

Termination of the concession?

Expiry: What happens to the assets?



## Protecting the Public Interest

### Setting and controlling fares/tolls

- Demand risk with public or private sector?
- Availability payment structures
- With demand risk, balance various factors:
  - degree of freedom to set tariffs
  - policy considerations
  - "value" of the concession to the private sector
- Contractual formula or independent regulation
- Certainty and scope for political manipulation



## Protecting the Public Interest

### Policing excessive returns?

- "Super-profits"
  - deal priced in competitive environment
  - should upside be capped?
- Refinancing gain
  - reduced risk profile after construction
  - reduced risk profile of maturing market
  - public sector share in any gain?
- Equity disposals



## Responding to poor service delivery

- Calibration and operation of payment tools
- Performance monitoring regime
- Escalation of remedies:
  - warning
  - direct specific action
  - termination
- Step-in and self-help remedies
- Responding to emergency situations



## Protecting the Public Interest

### Insolvency of private partners

- Concession company:
  - visibility and time to plan
  - commercial debt incentivised to assist
  - ultimate control of assets
  - take in-house or hand to replacement contractor
  - "work-out" most likely in practice
- Sub-contractor:
  - private partner incentivised to manage
  - control over unsuitable replacement
- Provider of finance



## Termination of the concession

- Ultimate right if service is not acceptable
  - long term inadequate service
  - one-off "material" failure
- Ability to control ownership of assets
- Public sector windfall?
- Compensation to private financiers
  - bankability and cost of capital
  - basis of calculation



## Expiry: What happens to the assets?

- **Public sector direction**
  - decided at the outset
  - option close to expiry
- **Main options**
  - revert to public ownership
  - private sector retain decommissioning risk/residual value risk
- **Asset condition at expiry**
  - requirement for specified condition?
  - retentions/reserves in final years of concession



## How the Public Sector Can Facilitate Success

Create institutional certainty

Educate the public about PPP's

Prioritize and screen projects

Appoint senior government "champions"


Create a clear decision making hierarchy

Be an effective counterparty with sufficient resources and experienced external advisors

Adopt standardized procurement practices

Clear accountability and transparency of the procurement process

Be prepared to provide credit support to projects



## What PPPs Are Not: Dispelling The Myths

### Myth #1

- PPPs = Privatization

### Myth #2

- PPPs generate large upfront payments to the government

### Myth #3

- PPPs cost more to the public

### Myth #4

- Private sector participation comes at the expense of service

### Myth #5

- Facilities suffer under PPP projects

### Myth #6

- PPPs are less transparent

### Myth #7

- PPPs lead to public sector job losses

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